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ABSTRACT
The cumulative increase in expenditures  on 
U.S. domestic  homeland security over the 
decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. 
It is  clearly  time to examine these massive 
expenditures  applying risk assessment and 
cost-benefit approaches  that have been 
standard for decades. Thus  far, officials  do 
not seem  to have done so  and have engaged 
in various forms  of probability  neglect by 
focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, 
rather than multiplying,  the probabilities; 
assessing relative, rather than absolute, 
risk; and inflating terrorist capacities  and 
the importance of potential terrorist targets. 
We find that enhanced expenditures have 
been excessive.  To  be deemed cost-effective 
in analyses  that substantially  bias the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o w a r d t h e o p p o s i t e 
conclusion,  the security measures would 
have to  deter,  prevent,  foil,  or protect each 
year against 1,667 otherwise successful 
attacks  that each inflicted some $100 million 
in damage (more  than four per day) or 167 
attacks  inflicting $1 billion in damage 
(nearly one  every two days).  This  is in the 
range of destruction of what might have 
happened had the  Times-Square bomber of 
2010 been successful.  Although there are 
emotional and political pressures  on the 
terrorism  issue, this  does  not relieve 
pol i t ic ians and bureaucrats of the 
fundamental responsibility of informing the 
public of the limited risk that terrorism 
presents,  of seeking to expend funds  wisely, 
and of bearing in mind opportunity  costs. 
Moreover, political concerns  may be over-
wrought: restrained reaction has often 
proved to be entirely acceptable politically. 
And avoiding overreaction is  by far the most 
cost-effective counterterrorism measure.
INTRODUCTION
In  seeking  to evaluate the  effectiveness of the 
massive increases in  homeland security 
expenditures since the terrorist  attacks on  the 
United States of September 11, 2001,  the 
common and urgent query  has been “are  we 
safer?”  This, however,  is the wrong question. 
Of course we are “safer”— the posting of a 
single security  guard at one building’s 
e n t r a n c e e n h a n c e s s a f e t y , h o w e v e r 
microscopically.  The correct  question is “are 
the gains in security  worth  the funds 
expended?”  Or  as this absolutely  central 
question  was posed shortly  after  9/11  by  risk 
analyst  Howard Kunreuther,  "How  much 
should we be willing  to pay  for  a  small 
reduction in  probabilities that  are already 
extremely low?"1
TALLYING THE COSTS – ONE 
TRILLION DOLLARS AND 
COUNTING
We have,  in  fact,  paid – or been  willing  to pay 
– a  lot.  In  the years immediately  following 
the terrorist  attacks of September  11,  2001  on 
W a s h i n g t o n  a n d N e w  Y o r k , i t  w a s 
understandable that  there was a  tendency  to 
fashion policy  and to expend funds in  haste 
and confusion, and maybe even  hysteria,  on 
homeland security.  After  all,  intelligence was 
estimating  at the time that  there were as 
many  as 5,000 al  Qaeda  operatives at  large in 
the country,2  and as New  York  Mayor  Rudy 
Giuliani reflected later,  "Anybody, any  one of 
these security  experts, including myself, 
would have told you  on September  11,  2001, 
we're looking  at  dozens and dozens and 
multi-years of attacks like this."3
The intelligence claims and the anxieties 
of Giuliani and other  “security  experts”  have 
clearly  proved,  putting it  mildly, to be 
unjustified.  In  the frantic interim, however, 
the United States government increased its 
expenditures for  dealing with  terrorism 
massively.  As we approach  the tenth 
anniversary  of 9/11,  federal  expenditures on 
domestic homeland security  have increased 
by  some $360 billion over  those in  place in 
2001. Moreover, federal national intelligence 
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expenditures aimed at  defeating terrorists at 
home and abroad have gone up by  $110 
billion, while state, local, and private sector 
expenditures have increased by  two hundred 
billion  more. And the vast  majority  of this 
increase, of course, has been  driven  by  much 
heightened fears of terrorism,  not by  growing 
concerns about  other  hazards – as Veronique 
de Rugy  has noted,  by  2008 federal  spending 
o n c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m  h a d i n c r e a s e d 
enormously  while protection  for  such 
comparable risks as fraud and violent crime 
had not,  to the point  where homeland 
security  expenditures had outpaced spending 
on all crime by $15 billion.4
Tallying  all these expenditures and adding 
in  opportunity  costs – but  leaving  out the 
costs of the terrorism-related (or  terrorism-
determined) wars in  Iraq and Afghanistan 
and quite a  few  other  items that might  be 
included – the increase in expenditures on 
domestic homeland security  over  the decade 
exceeds one trillion dollars. The details are in 
Table 1. This has not  been enough  to move 
the country  into bankruptcy, Osama  bin 
Laden’s stated goal  after  9/11,  but  it  clearly 
adds up to real money,  even  by  Washington 
standards.5  Other  countries like Britain, 
Canada,  and Australia have also dramatically 
increased their expenditures.
Table 1. The Trillion Dollar Table
Enhanced Costs of Homeland Security since 9/11, in billions of 2010 dollars
Enhanced Direct Expenditures 2009 2001-11
Federal homeland security expenditures 50 360
Federal intelligence expenditures 15 110
Local and state expenditures 10 110
Private-sector spending 10 110
                                                                                               Total 85 690
Opportunity Costs
Terrorism risk insurance premiums 4 40
Passenger delays caused by airport screening 10 100
Increase in short-haul traffic fatalities for people avoiding airport delays 3 32
Deadweight losses and losses in consumer welfare 30 245
                                                                                              Total 47 417
Relevant spending elements not included in the table: 
• Terror-related wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Costs  of  crime facilitated by  focus of  police and FBI 
on, or preoccupation with, terrorism
• Costs  resulting from hurricane Katrina that might 
have been mitigated if  DHS had not been so 
preoccupied by terrorism
• Additional Post Office expenditures to deal with the 
effects of 9/11 and the anthrax letters
• Effects on tourism, property  and stock market values, 
business location decisions, etc. though dead weight 
losses might capture some of these
• In addition to the short-haul fatality  effect included in 
the table,  the increase in traffic fatalities in the U.S. of 
2,300 lives to the end of  2003 due to the fear of  flying 
and the inconvenience of extra passenger screening 
• Extra fuel cost to airlines because of  the weight of 
hardened (heavier) cockpit doors
• Free airline seats to Federal Air Marshals
• Passenger delays and inconvenience cause by  false 
positive identification on TSA’s no fly list.
• Cutbacks to Medicare, Medicaid, education, social 
security, and other government services in an effort 
to reign in budget deficits caused by  wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and mushrooming homeland security 
budgets
Note: For sources and full explanation of  these 
numbers, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, 
Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits,  and Costs of Homeland Security (New York 
and Oxford, UK: Oxford Universi ty  Press, 
forthcoming in early September 2011).
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EVALUATING THE 
EXPENDITURES
In  this article we seek  to apply  conventional 
cost-benefit  and risk analytic approaches to 
this massive increase in  expenditure in  an 
effort  to provide an answer  to Kureuther’s 
exceedingly  apt  question.  These approaches 
have been  recommended for many  years by 
the United States Office  of Management and 
Budget,  and they  are routinely  used by  such 
agencies as the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,  the Environmental Protection 
A g e n c y ,  a n d t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n 
Administration, and in  2004  the 9/11 
Commission  specifically  called on  the 
government  to apply  them  to assess the risks 
and cost-effectiveness of security  measures 
put  in place to deal with  terrorism. 6 However, 
it appears that this simply has not been done.
Upon  taking  office in  2005,  Department  of 
Homeland Security  Secretary  Michael 
Chertoff did strongly  advocate a  risk-based 
approach, insisting that  the department 
"must base its work on  priorities driven  by 
risk."7  Yet,  a  year  later,  when DHS 
expenditures had increased by  some $135 
billion  beyond those already  in  place in  2001 
and when  the department had become the 
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s l a r g e s t  n o n - m i l i t a r y 
bureaucracy,  one of its senior  economists 
wistfully  noted,  “We really  don't know  a 
whole lot about the overall costs and benefits 
of homeland security."8
By  2007, RAND President  James 
Thomson  was contending  that  DHS leaders 
"manage by  inbox" with  the "dominant  mode 
of DHS behavior being  crisis management." 
Most  programs are implemented, he 
continued,  "with  little or no evaluation”  of 
their  performance or effectiveness, and the 
agency  "receives little analytical  advice on 
issues of policy, program, and budget."9  And, 
after an  exhaustive assessment, the 
Congressional  Research  Service concluded at 
the same time that DHS simply  could not 
answer  the "central question" about  the "rate 
of return,  as defined by  quantifiable and 
e m p i r i c a l  r i s k r e d u c t i o n s " o n  i t s 
expenditure.10
The boilerplate emphasis on  risk-informed 
decision  making  continued with  the change 
of administrations after  the 2008  elections, 
as Secretary Janet Napolitano insisted that
Development and implementation  of  a 
process and methodology to assess 
national  risk is a fundamental  and critical 
element of an  overall risk management 
process, with the ultimate goal of 
improving  the ability of  decision  makers 
to make rational  judgments about 
tradeoffs between  courses of action to 
manage homeland security risk. 11
Such  declarations notwithstanding, 
however, we have been able to find only  one 
published reference to a  numerical estimate 
of risk  reduction  after  an  extensive search  of 
the agency’s reports and documents.12 
Moreover, we have been  able to find no 
reference whatever  to the likelihood of a 
terrorist  attack beyond rather vague 
references such  as “high,”  “imminent,” 
“dynamic,” “persistent,” and “emerging.”
Indeed, at  times DHS has ignored specific 
calls by  other government agencies to 
conduct  risk assessments.  In  2010, the 
Department began  deploying full-body 
scanners at  airports,  a  technology  that will 
cost  $1.2  billion per  year. The Government 
Accountability  Office specifically declared 
that  conducting a  cost-benefit analysis of this 
new  technology  to be “important.” 13 As far  as 
we can see,  no such  study  was conducted. Or 
there was GAO’s request that DHS conduct a 
full cost/benefit  analysis of the extremely 
costly  process of scanning 100 percent of 
U.S.-bound containers. To do so would 
require the dedicated work of a  few  skilled 
analysts for  a  few  months or  possibly  a  year. 
Yet,  DHS replied that,  although  it agreed that 
such  a  study  would help to “frame the 
discussion and better  inform  Congress,”  to 
actually  carry  it  out  “would place significant 
burdens on agency resources.” 14
Clearly, DHS focuses all  or  almost all  of its 
analyses on the contemplation  of the 
consequences of a  terrorist attack  while 
substantially  ignoring the equally  important 
likelihood component  of risk  assessment as 
well  as the key  issue of risk  reduction.  In 
general,  risk assessment  seems to be simply  a 
process of identifying  a  potential  source of 
harm  and then trying  to do something about 
it  without  evaluating whether  the new 
measures reduce risk  sufficiently  to justify 
their costs.
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This conclusion  was strongly  supported by 
a  2010 report of the National Research 
Council of the National Academies of 
Sciences,  Engineering,  and Medicine. 
Requested by  Congress to assess the activities 
of the Department  of Homeland Security,  a 
committee worked for  nearly  two years on  the 
project and came up with  some striking 
conclusions.  Except for the analysis of 
natural disasters, the committee “did not  find 
any  DHS risk analysis capabilities and 
methods that are yet adequate for supporting 
DHS decision making,”  and therefore “only 
low  confidence should be placed in  most of 
the risk  analyses conducted by  DHS.”  Indeed, 
“little  effective attention  was paid to the 
features of the risk problem  that  are 
fundamental.”  It also found an  “absence of 
documentation of methods and processes” 
with  the result  that  the committee sometimes 
had to infer details about DHS risk  modeling. 
Indeed, “in a  number  of cases examined by 
the committee, it  is not  clear  what problem  is 
being addressed.”  It also found “a pattern”  of 
“trusting numbers that  are highly  uncertain.” 
And, concluded the committee rather glumly, 
“it  is not yet clear  that  DHS is on  a trajectory 
for  development  of methods and capability 
that  is sufficient  to ensure reliable risk 
analyses”: although  it  found that “there are 
people at  DHS who are aware of these current 
limitations,”  it  “did not  hear of efforts to 
remedy them.” 15
Overall, it  seems,  security  concerns that 
happen  to rise to the top of the agenda  are 
serviced without much  in the way  of full 
evaluation – security  trumps economics,  as 
one insider puts it  – and such  key  issues as 
acceptable risk  are rarely  discussed while 
extravagant worst  case scenario thinking 
dominates, and frequently  savagely  distorts, 
the discussion.
It is clearly  time to examine massive 
homeland security  expenditures in  a  careful 
and systematic  way,  applying  the kind of 
analytic risk  management  approaches 
emphasizing  cost-benefit  analysis and 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b l e a n d 
unacceptable risks that  are routinely  required 
of other  governmental  agencies and that  have 
been standard coin  for  policy  decision-
making  for  decades throughout the world 
when  determining  regulations even  in  such 
highly  charged and politicized decisions as 
those regarding  where to situate  nuclear 
power  plants, how  to dispose of toxic  waste, 
and how  to control  pollution—decisions that 
engage the interests and passions of multiple 
groups.
PROBABILITY NEGLECT
A  recent  book  by  Gregory  Treverton, a risk 
analyst  at  the RAND Corporation whose work 
we have found highly  valuable at  various 
points in this study,  contains a  curious 
reflection: 
When I spoke about the terrorist threat, 
especially  in  the first years after 2001, I 
was often asked what people could do to 
protect their  family and home. I usually 
responded by giving the analyst’s  answer, 
what I labeled “the RAND answer.” 
Anyone’s probability  of being killed by a 
terrorist today  was essentially zero and 
would be tomorrow, barring a major 
discontinuity. So, they should do nothing. 
It is not surprising that the answer was 
hardly  satisfying, and I did not regard it at 
such.16
From  this experience, he concluded, “People 
want  information,  but  the challenge for 
government is to warn without terrifying.” 17
It is not  clear  why  anyone should find his 
observation  unsatisfying  since it  simply  puts 
the terrorist  threat  in  general and in  personal 
context, suggesting that excessive alarm 
about  the issue is scarcely  called for.  It  is,  one 
might  suspect,  exactly  the kind of accurate, 
reassuring, adult, and non-terrifying 
information  people have been  yearning  for. 
And it  deals frontally  with  a  key  issue in  risk 
assessment: evaluating the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack.
Treverton’s “RAND answer,”  calmly  (and 
accurately)  detailing  the likelihood of the 
terrorist  hazard and putting  it  in  reasonable 
context,  has scarcely  ever  been  duplicated by 
politicians and officials in  charge of providing 
public safety. Instead the awkward problem 
of dealing  with exceedingly  low  probabilities 
has been finessed – and questionable 
expenditures accordingly  justified – by  five 
stratagems that  in  various ways embrace a 
form  of risk  aversion  that  can  be called 
"probability neglect."
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FOCUSING ON WORST CASE SCENARIOS
Cass Sunstein,  who seems to have invented 
the phrase, “probability  neglect,”  assesses the 
version  of the phenomena  that  comes into 
being when “emotions are intensely 
engaged.”  Under that circumstance,  he 
argues, “people’s attention  is focused on  the 
bad outcome itself, and they  are inattentive to 
the fact that it  is unlikely  to occur.”  Moreover, 
they  are inclined to “demand a  substantial 
governmental response – even if the 
magnitude of the risk does not  warrant the 
response.” 18 It  may  be this phenomenon  that 
Treverton experienced.
Playing  to this demand,  government 
officials are inclined to focus on worst  case 
scenarios,  presumably  in the knowledge, 
following  Sunstein’s insight,  that  this can 
e m o t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f y  j u s t  a b o u t a n y 
expenditure no matter  how  unlikely  the 
prospect  the dire event  will actually  take 
place. Accordingly, there is a  preoccupation 
with  “low  probability/high consequence” 
events such as the detonation  of a  sizeable 
nuclear  device in midtown  Manhattan  even 
though  the vast bulk of homeland security 
expenditures are focused on  comparatively 
low  consequence events like explosions set  off 
by individual amateurs.
It is sometimes argued that  conventional 
risk analysis breaks down under  extreme 
conditions because the risk is now  a  very 
large number  (losses) multiplied by  a  very 
small number (attack probability).  However, 
it  is not the risk  analysis methodology  that  is 
at  fault  here, but  our  ability  to use the 
information  obtained from  the analysis for 
decision-making.  Analyst  Bruce Schneier has 
written  penetratingly  of worst-case thinking. 
He points out that
[It] involves imagining the worst possible 
outcome and then acting as if  it  were a 
certainty. It substitutes imagination for 
thinking, speculation  for risk analysis, 
a n d f e a r f o r r e a s o n . I t f o s t e r s 
powerlessness and vulnerability and 
magnifies social  paralysis. And it makes 
us more vulnerable to the effects of 
terrorism.19
It leads to bad decision making because
It's  only half of the cost-benefit equation. 
Every decision  has costs and benefits, 
risks and rewards. By speculating about 
what can possibly go wrong, and then 
acting as if  that is likely to happen, worst-
case thinking focuses only on  the extreme 
but improbable risks and does  a poor job 
at assessing outcomes.20
It also assumes “that  a  proponent  of an 
action  must prove that  the nightmare 
scenario is impossible,”  and it  “can be used to 
support  any  position  or  its opposite.  If we 
build a  nuclear  power plant,  it  could melt 
down.  If we don't  build it,  we will  run short of 
power  and society  will collapse into anarchy.” 
And worst,  it  “validates ignorance”  because, 
“instead of focusing  on  what  we know,  it 
focuses on  what we don't  know  – and what 
we can imagine.”  In  the process “risk 
assessment is devalued” and “probabilistic 
t h i n k i n g i s r e p u d i a t e d i n  f a v o r  o f 
"possibilistic thinking."21
What  is necessary  is due consideration  to 
the spectrum  of threats,  not simply  the worst 
one imaginable,  in  order  to properly 
understand,  and to coherently  deal with,  the 
risks to people,  institutions,  and the 
economy.  The relevant  decision-makers are 
professionals, and it  is not unreasonable to 
suggest that they  should do so seriously. 
Notwithstanding political  pressures,  the fact 
that  the public  has difficulties with 
probabilities when emotions are involved 
does not relieve those in  charge of the 
requirement, even  the duty, to make 
decisions about  the expenditures of vast 
quantities of public monies in  a  responsible 
manner.
ADDING, RATHER THAN MULTIPLYING, THE 
PROBABILITIES
A  second stratagem  for  neglecting probability 
that  is sometimes applied at DHS is to devise 
a  rating  scale where probabilities of attack 
are added to the losses. Thus,  as a 
Congressional Research  Service analysis 
points out,  to determine whether  a  potential 
target should be protected, DHS has 
frequently  assessed the target's vulnerability 
and the consequences of an  attack  on it  on  an 
80  point scale and the likelihood it  will  be 
attacked on a  20  point  ranked scale.  It then 
adds these together. 22  Thus, a  vulnerable 
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target  whose destruction  would be highly 
consequential would be protected even  if the 
likelihood it  will be attacked is zero, and a 
l e s s c o n s e q u e n t i a l t a r g e t  c o u l d g o 
unprotected even  if the likelihood it  will  be 
attacked is 100 percent.
This procedure violates the principles 
espoused in  all risk  assessment  techniques 
such  as those codified in  international risk 
management  standards supported by  twenty-
six  countries including  the United States.23 In 
these risk  is invariably  taken  to be a  product 
in  which  the attack probability  is multiplied 
by  the losses,  not added to them. Essentially, 
what  often  seems to be happening  is that 
DHS has a  pot  of money  to dole  out, and it 
has worked out a  method for  determining 
which  projects are most  worthy  while 
avoiding determining  whether  any  of them 
are actually worth any money at all.
ASSESSING RELATIVE, RATHER THAN 
ABSOLUTE, RISK
A  third technique, related to the second, is, as 
the CRS study  points out, simply  to rank 
relative risk while neglecting to determine the 
actual magnitude of the risk.24  The 2010 
National Research  Council study  finds this 
approach to be wanting:
Risk management decisions seek to reduce 
risks in  accordance with specified, absolute 
risk criteria for human  health protection. 
Many of the risk analyses thus far 
conducted by DHS involve risk ranking, 
based on scales  of  presumed relative risks, 
and do not include attempts to provide 
absolute measures of risk.25
It may  be true that  New  York is more 
likely  to be struck by  a  terrorist  than, say, 
Columbus, Ohio.  But it  is also more likely  to 
be struck  by  a  tsunami, and not  only  in 
Hollywood disaster  thrillers. Before spending 
a  lot of money  protecting  New  York  from  a 
tsunami,  we need to get  some sort  of sense 
about what  the likelihood of that  event 
actually  is, not  simply  how  the risk compares 
to that borne by  other  cities. And the same 
goes for terrorism.
INFLATING THE IMPORTANCE OF  POTENTIAL 
TERRORIST TARGETS
A  fourth stratagem  is to inflate the 
importance of potential terrorist  targets. 
Thus, nearly  half of American  federal 
homeland security  expenditure  is devoted to 
protect ing what the Department  of 
Homeland Security  and various presidential 
and Congressional reports and directives 
r a t h e r  e x t r a v a g a n t l y  c a l l " c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure" and "key resources.”
Applying common  sense English  about 
what  “critical infrastructure”  could be taken 
to mean, it  should be an  empty  category.  If 
any  element  in  the infrastructure is truly 
"critical" to the operation of the country, 
steps should be taken  immediately  to provide 
redundancies or backup systems so that  it  is 
no longer  so.  An  official definition designates 
“critical  infrastructure”  to include “the assets, 
systems, and networks, whether  physical  or 
virtual,  so vital  to the United States that their 
incapacitation  or  destruction  would have a 
debilitating  effect on  security,  national 
economic  security, public health  or  safety, or 
any  combination  thereof.” 26 Yet vast sums of 
money  are spent under  the program  to 
protect  elements of the infrastructure whose 
i n c a p a c i t a t i o n  w o u l d s c a r c e l y  b e 
“debilitating” and would at  most impose 
minor inconvenience and quite limited costs.
And the same essentially  holds for  what 
DHS designates as "key  resources," or 
formerly  as “key  assets.”  These are defined to 
be those that  are "essential to the minimal 
operations of the economy  or government."27 
It is difficult  to imagine what a  terrorist 
group armed with  anything  less than  a 
massive thermonuclear  arsenal could do to 
hamper  such  "minimal operations." The 
terrorist  attacks of 9/11  were by  far  the most 
damaging in history, yet,  even  though  several 
m a j o r  c o m m e r c i a l b u i l d i n g s w e r e 
demolished,  both  the economy  and 
government  continued to function  at 
considerably above the "minimal" level.
The very  phrase,  “homeland security,” 
contains aspects of a  similar inflation  in  its 
suggestion that  that  essential security  of the 
entire country  is at  stake. In  Canada, the 
comparable department  is labeled with  more 
accuracy  and less drama  simply  as “public 
safety.”  Given the actually  magnitude of the 
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terrorist  hazard,  the homeland is, as it 
happens, really  quite  secure,  though  there 
may  be justifiable concerns about  the public’s 
safety under some conditions.
INFLATING TERRORIST CAPACITIES
A  final stratagem  is to fail to assess,  or 
massively  to inflate, the capacities of the 
terrorists, and therefore by  inference both  the 
l ikel ihood they  wi l l attack and the 
consequences of that attack.  This is 
something  that should be of absolutely  key 
importance yet , in i ts big nat ional 
infrastructure protection report  of 2009,  the 
DHS devotes only  two paragraphs to 
describing  the nature of the “terrorist 
adversary" – a  designation  that implies far 
more coordination  among  terrorists than 
experience suggests is valid. 28  Moreover, 
none of this fleeting  discussion shows any 
depth, and the report prefers instead to spew 
out adjectives like "relentless," "patient," and 
"flexible," terms that  scarcely  characterize the 
vast majority of potential terrorists.
The report  goes on  to argue without 
qualification  that the “terrorist adversary” 
not only  “shows an understanding  of the 
potential consequence of carefully  planned 
attacks on  economic, transportation,  and 
symbolic  targets,”  but  that  it  “seriously 
threatens national security,  and could inflict 
mass casualties, weaken the economy, and 
damage public morale and confidence.”  This 
too is a  rather  extravagant exaggeration  of 
the threat most terrorists present.
The ultimate in  such  thinking  – common 
during  the administration of George W. Bush 
and continued more sporadically  in  the 
administration  of his successor,  Barack 
Obama  – is to characterize the terrorist 
threat  as “existential.”  In  2008, Homeland 
Security  Secretary  Michael Chertoff even 
proclaimed the “struggle”  against  terrorism 
to be a  “significant existential”  one – carefully 
differentiating it,  apparently, from  all  those 
insignificant  existential struggles Americans 
have waged in  the past. 29 Rather  amazingly, 
such  extreme expressions,  which  if accepted 
as valid, can close off all judicious evaluation 
of the problem, have only  rarely  been  called 
into question.
In  stark contrast,  Glenn  Carle,  a twenty-
three-year  veteran  of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, where he was deputy  national 
intelligence officer  for  transnational threats, 
has warned "We must  not take fright  at  the 
specter our  leaders have exaggerated. In  fact, 
we must  see jihadists for  the small,  lethal, 
disjointed and miserable opponents that they 
are." Al-Qaeda "has only  a  handful of 
individuals capable of planning,  organizing 
and leading a  terrorist organization," and 
although  they  have threatened attacks, "its 
capabilities are far inferior to its desires."30
In  evaluating  al-Qaeda’s present capacity 
to inflict  damage and its likelihood of doing 
so,  a  good place to start  is with analyses 
provided by  Marc Sageman.31  A  former 
intelligence officer  with  experience in 
Afghanistan, Sageman has carefully  and 
systematically  combed through  both  open 
and classified data  on  jihadists and would-be 
jihadists around the world.
Al-Qaeda  central, he concludes,  consists of 
a  cluster  less than  150 actual people. Other 
estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central 
generally  come in  with  numbers in  the same 
order  of magnitude as those suggested by 
Sageman.32  Sageman may  be going  too far 
when  he argues "there  is not much  left  of al-
Qaeda except in the minds of those inside the 
beltway."33  But  that  possibility  should be 
included in the discussion  at  least as much  as 
ones that  confer  on  al-Qaeda  capacities that 
are at once monumental and mounting.
Beyond the tiny  band that constitutes al-
Qaeda central,  there are, continues Sageman, 
thousands of sympathizers and wouldbe 
jihadists spread around the globe who mainly 
connect in  Internet chat  rooms,  engage in 
radicalizing  conversations,  and variously  dare 
each  other  to actually  do something. 34 All  of 
these rather  hapless – perhaps even  pathetic 
– people should of course be considered to be 
potentially  dangerous. From  time to time 
they  may  be able to coalesce enough  to carry 
out acts of terrorist  violence,  and policing 
efforts to stop them  before they  can  do so are 
certainly  justified.  But the notion  that they 
present  an existential threat  to just about 
anybody  seems at least as fanciful  as some of 
their schemes.
By  2005, after  years of well-funded 
sleuthing, the FBI and other  investigative 
agencies noted in  a report  that they  had been 
unable to uncover  a  single true al-Qaeda 
sleeper  cell anywhere in  the United States,  a 
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f i n d i n g  ( o r  n o n - f i n d i n g ) p u b l i c l y 
acknowledged two years later  in  a  press 
conference and when  the officer  who drafted 
that  year’s National Intelligence Estimate 
testified that “we do not  see”  al-Qaeda 
operatives functioning  inside the United 
States.35 Indeed, they  have been scarcely  able 
to unearth  anyone who might  even  be 
deemed to have a  “connection”  to the 
diabolical group.
It follows that  any  terrorism  problem  in 
the United States and the West  principally 
derives from  rather  small numbers of 
homegrown people, often  isolated from  each 
other,  who fantasize about  performing  dire 
deeds and sometimes receive a  bit  of training 
and inspiration  overseas.  Indeed, in 
testimony  on January  11,  2007,  Mueller 
stressed that  his chief concern  within  the 
United States had become homegrown 
groups,  a  sentiment  later  endorsed by 
Obama’s Homeland Security  Secretary  Janet 
Napolitano in 2009.36
Assessing  the threat from  homegrown 
Islamist terrorists, Brian  Jenkins stresses 
that  their  number is “tiny,”  representing  one 
out of every  30,000 Muslims in  the United 
States. This “very  low  level”  of recruitment 
finds very  little support  in  the Muslim 
community  at large: “they  are not Mao’s 
guerrillas swimming  in  a  friendly  sea.”  Given 
this situation,  concludes Jenkins, what  is to 
be anticipated is “tiny  conspiracies, lone 
gunmen, one-off attacks rather  than 
sustained terrorist  campaigns.” 37  In  the 
meantime, note other  researchers, Muslim 
extremists have been responsible for one 
fiftieth  of one percent of the homicides 
committed in the United States since 9/11.38
Because terrorism  of a  considerably 
destructive nature can  be perpetrated by  a 
very  small number of people, or  even  by  a 
single individual,  the fact that  terrorists are 
few  in  number  does not  mean  there is no 
problem, and from  time to time some of these 
people may  actually  manage to do some 
harm, though  in  most  cases their  capacities 
and schemes – or  alleged schemes – seem  to 
be far  less dangerous than  initial press 
reports suggest. 
The situation seems scarcely  different in 
Europe and other Western locations.  Political 
scientist  Michael Kenney  has interviewed 
dozens of officials and intelligence agents and 
analyzed court  documents.  He finds that, in 
sharp contrast with  the boi lerplate 
characterizations favored by  the DHS, 
Islamic  militants there are operationally 
unsophisticated, short  on  knowhow,  prone to 
make mistakes,  poor  at  planning, and limited 
in  their  capacity  to learn.39  Another  study 
documents the difficulties of network 
coordination  that continually  threaten 
operational  unity, trust,  cohesion,  and the 
ability to act collectively.40
For  several decades, the United States 
State Department  collected data  on 
international  or  transnational terrorism, 
defining  the act  as premeditated, politically 
m o t i v a t e d v i o l e n c e p e r p e t r a t e d b y 
subnational  groups or  clandestine agents 
against noncombatant targets (civilians and 
military  personnel who at the time of the 
incident  are unarmed or  not on duty) that 
involve citizens or  the territory  of more than 
one country. 41  The number of people 
worldwide who died during  the period as a 
result  of all  forms of transnational terrorism 
(Islamist  or  other) by  this definition  is 482  a 
year.  Another  study  using comparable data 
for  the longer period from  1968  to 2006 
arrives at an average of 420 per year.42
Another  approach  is to focus on  the kind 
of terrorism  that  really  concerns people in  the 
deve loped wor ld by  res tr ic t ing  the 
consideration  to violence committed by 
Muslim  extremists outside of war zones, 
whether  that violence be perpetrated by 
domestic Islamist  terrorists or  by  ones with 
international connections. Included in  the 
count  would be terrorism  of the much 
publicized sort  that occurred in  Bali in  2002 
and 2005, in  Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and 
Turkey  in  2003,  in  the Philippines,  Madrid, 
and Egypt in  2004,  and in  London  and 
Jordan  in  2005.  Three publications from 
think tanks have independently  provided lists 
or  tallies of such  violence committed in  the 
several years after the 9/11  attacks.43 The lists 
include not  only  attacks by  al-Qaeda but  also 
those by  its imitators, enthusiasts,  lookalikes, 
and wannabes,  as well as ones by  groups with 
no apparent  connection to it  whatever. 
Although  these tallies make for  grim  reading, 
the total number of people killed in  the years 
after  9/11  by  Muslim  extremists outside of 
war  zones comes to some 200 to 300  per 
year.  That, of course, is 200  to 300 too many, 
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but it  hardly  suggests that  the destructive 
capacities of the terrorists are monumental. 
For  comparison, during the same period 
more people – 320  per  year  – drowned in 
bathtubs in  the United States alone.44  Or 
there is another, rather  unpleasant 
comparison. Increased delays and added 
costs at  U.S.  airports due to new  security 
procedures provide incentive for  many  short-
haul passengers to drive to their  destination 
rather  than  flying, and,  since driving  is far 
riskier  than  air  travel, the extra  automobile 
traffic generated has been  estimated in  one 
study  to result  in  500  or  more extra  road 
fatalities per year.45
EVALUATING INCREASES IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY SPENDING 
IN THE UNITED STATES
In  the end,  one might  darkly  suspect, various 
versions of probability  neglect  are  grasped 
because, if realistic probabilities that a  given 
target  would be struck by  terrorists were 
multiplied into the risk calculation  and if the 
costs of protection  from  unlikely  threats were 
sensibly  calculated following standard 
procedures, it  would be found that  vast 
amounts of money have been misspent.
Although  measuring  risk can  be difficult, it 
is done as a matter of course in other  areas 
including such  highly  charged ones as nuclear 
power  plant  accidents (where malevolent 
threats are explicitly  considered),  aviation 
safety,  and environmental protection. 
Moreover, there is plenty  of data  on  how 
much  damage terrorists have been  able to do 
over  the decades and about  how  frequently 
they  attack. Seen  in  reasonable  context, both 
of these numbers are exceedingly  small, at 
least outside of war zones.
The insurance industry  has a  distinct 
financial imperative to understand terrorism 
risks. In  the immediate aftermath  of the 9/11 
attacks in  which  insured losses reached $35 
billion,  most insurance firms placed 
terrorism  exclusions on  their  policies.46 Since 
then, however, the United States government 
implemented the Terrorism  Risk Insurance 
Act  to provide “a  temporary  window  of 
reinsurance relief to help insurers manage 
the ongoing  risk of terrorism.” 47  With  that, 
insurance firms re-entered the terrorism 
insurance market, and by  2009  the median 
terrorism  insurance premium  for  a  $303 
million property  had more than halved to 
only  $9,541  per  year. 48  This represents a 
conservative measure of expected loss or  risk, 
and a simple back-calculation  in  the risk 
equation suggests that the insurer  estimates 
the likelihood of a  terrorist attack  on a 
property  to be very  low: less than  one in 
thirty  thousand per  year.49  If the private 
sector  can estimate terrorism  risks and is 
willing to risk its own  money  on  the validity 
of the estimate, why can’t the DHS?
It  is certainly  true that improbable 
disastrous events – like the 9/11  attacks – do 
sometimes transpire. That  is,  in  fact,  why  we 
call them  improbable as opposed to 
impossible. But  because improbable events 
sometimes do take place does not mean that 
all improbable events therefore become 
probable. To avoid or  to ignore this elemental 
consideration  is to engage in  faulty,  even 
irrational, planning and decision-making. 
A  conventional approach  to cost-
effectiveness compares the costs of security 
measures with  the benefits as tallied in  lives 
saved and damages averted. A  security 
measure is cost-effective when  the benefit  of 
the measure outweighs the costs of providing 
the security measures.
BENEFIT
The benefit of a security measure is a 
function of three elements:
Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) × 
(losses sustained in the successful attack) × 
(reduction in risk)
In  the matter  at hand,  where we are 
concerned with  the cost-effectiveness of 
enhanced (post-9/11) security  expenditures, 
the probability of a successful attack  is the 
likelihood a  successful  terrorist  attack will 
take place if no new  security  measures were 
put into place.  As discussed earlier, 
terrorism, at  least outside war  zones,  is very 
infrequent: it is a low-probability event.
The losses sustained in the successful 
attack  include the fatalities and other 
damage – both  direct  and indirect  – caused 
by  the terrorist  attack, taking  into account the 
value and vulnerability  of people and 
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infrastructure as well as any  psychological 
and political effects. A  successful terrorist 
attack  can  inflict costs in  the tens of millions 
of dollars.  Exceptional attacks, like the one 
on  9/11, can  cost  $200 billion, and losses 
could conceivably  reach  five trillion  dollars 
for  the nightmare scenario of the detonation 
of a  sizeable nuclear  device in  a  densely 
populated area of a city.50
The third and final consideration  in 
calculating the benefit  of the security 
expenditures is the reduction in risk,  which 
in  this case concerns the effectiveness of the 
security  measures to foil, deter,  disrupt,  or 
protect  against a  terrorist  attack. 51 That is,  it 
is the degree to which  new  security  measures 
reduce the  likelihood of a successful terrorist 
attack  and/or the losses sustained in such an 
attack.
In  assessing  risk  reduction,  it is important 
first  to look at the effectiveness of homeland 
security  measures that  were in  place before 
9/11  in reducing risk.  The 9/11  Commission’s 
report  points to a  number  of failures, but  it 
acknowledges as well  that  terrorism  was 
already  a  high priority  of the United States 
government  before 9/11.52 More pointed is an 
observation  of Michael Sheehan, former  New 
York City  Deputy  Commissioner  for 
Counterterrorism:
The most important work in  protecting our 
country since 9/11  has been  accomplished 
with  the capacity that was in place when 
the event happened, not with  any of the 
new capability  bought since 9/11. I firmly 
believe that those huge budget increases 
have not significantly  contributed to our 
post-9/11 security…. The big  wins had little 
to do with the new programs.53
As this suggests, police and domestic 
intelligence agencies have long  had in  place 
procedures, techniques,  trained personnel, 
and action plans to deal with  bombs and 
shootings and those who plot  them. Indeed, 
according  to 9/11’s chief planner,  Khalid 
Sheikh  Mohammed, the greatest  difficulty  the 
plotters faced was getting  their  band of 
terrorists into the United States.  It  may  be 
even  more difficult  now, but the strictures 
before already  presented a  considerable 
hurdle.54 
There is another  consideration.  The tragic 
events of 9/11  massively  heightened the 
awareness of the public to the threat of 
terrorism, resulting in  extra vigilance that  has 
often  resulted in  the arrest of terrorists or  the 
f o i l i n g  o f t e r r o r i s t a t t e m p t s .  M o s t 
dramatically,  because airplane passengers 
have become much more attuned to 
suspicious or  dodgy  behavior  of their  fellow 
passengers, two terrorist  attempts to blow  up 
airliners have been  foiled: the  shoe bombing 
effort  of 2001  and the underwear effort of 
2009.  Both  were detected and restrained by 
crews and passengers,  not  by  the many  costly 
enhanced security  measures put into place by 
the TSA. The same holds for  the peddler in 
New  York who reported the smoking  vehicle 
bomb in Times Square in 2010.  Indeed,  tip-
offs have been  key  to prosecutions in  many  of 
the terrorism  cases in  the United States since 
9/11.  Importantly, the inspiration  of extra 
vigilance comes at no cost to the taxpayer.
In  our  analysis we will assume that  risk 
reduction caused by  the security  measures in 
place before 9/11  and by  the extra  vigilance of 
the public after that  event  reduced risk  by  50 
percent.  This is an  exceedingly  conservative 
estimate not  only  because of Sheehan’s 
observation, but because security  measures 
that  are at once effective and relatively 
inexpensive are generally  the first  to be 
implemented – for  example,  one erects 
warning signs on a  potentially  dangerous 
curve in the road before rebuilding  the 
highway.  Furthermore,  most terrorists (or 
would-be terrorists) do not show  much 
intelligence, cleverness, resourcefulness,  or 
initiative, and therefore measures to deal 
with  them  are relatively  inexpensive and are 
likely  to be instituted first.  Dealing  with  the 
smarter  and more capable terrorists is more 
difficult and expensive,  but these people 
represent, it certainly  appears, a  decided 
minority among terrorists.
In addition, we will assume that the 
increase in  US expenditures on homeland 
security  since 2001  has been  dramatically 
effective,  reducing the remaining  risk by  an 
additional 45  percent. Total risk reduction, 
then  is generously  assumed to be 95  percent 
with  the pre-existing  measures and the extra 
public vigilance responsible  for  50  percent  of 
the risk reduction  and the enhanced 
expenditures responsible for  the remaining 
45 percent.
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COST
As indicated, benefits are a  multiplicative 
composite of three considerations: the 
probability  of a  successful attack,  the losses 
sustained in  a  successful attack, and the 
reduction  in  risk  furnished by  security 
measures. This product,  the benefit,  is then 
compared to the cost  of the security  measures 
instituted to attain the benefit.
For  the purposes of this analysis, we 
assess only  the costs of increased  government 
expenditures on homeland security  after  the 
9/11  attacks. That  is,  we assume homeland 
security  measures in  place before the attacks 
continue,  and we evaluate the additional 
funds that  have been  allocated to homeland 
security, almost  all of it designed,  of course, 
to deal  with  terrorism,  the only  hazard that 
notably  inspired increased alarm  after  the 
attacks.
United States federal government 
spending  on homeland security  increased 
from  $20.1  billion  in  2001,55 to $75  billion  in 
2009. 56  In  all,  federal  government  spending 
on  homeland security  for  2009  was $75 
billion  or  $50 billion  higher  in  2010  dollars 
than in 2001, adjusting for inflation.57
To limit  our  focus to increases in 
expenditures by  the federal government 
reported by  the OMB would be a  considerable 
restriction  because this ignores the recently 
declassified national  intelligence costs as well 
as state and local government outlays on 
homeland security.  As shown  in  Table 1,  we 
conservatively  estimate enhanced intelligence 
expenditures since 9/11  devoted to domestic 
homeland security  to be $15  billion  in  2009. 
As the Table also indicates,  enhanced outlays 
for  state and local homeland security 
spending  are approximately  $10 billion per 
year. 
The increase in  annual federal government 
outlays,  then, is $50  billion  per  year,  and the 
addition of national intelligence and state 
and local homeland security  outlays of $25 
billion  gives a  total of $75  billion. We will  use 
this figure,  although  it  is a very  conservative 
measure of the degree to which  homeland 
security  expenditures have risen  since 9/11 
because we do not  include several other  items 
totaling  (far) more than $200 billion  per  year 
as tallied in Table 1.  These include (1) private 
sector  expenditures on  homeland security 
related measures costing  $10 billion  per  year; 
(2) terrorism  risk  insurance premiums of 
nearly  $4  billion  per  year; (3) hidden  and 
indirect  costs or  “dead weight losses”  of 
implementing  security-related regulations 
that  amounted to at  least  $30 billion  in  lost 
output  per  year; (4)  various opportunity  costs 
including those attendant  on  the increase of 
500  traffic  fatalities per  year  due to increased 
delays and added costs at  airports diverting 
many  short-haul  passengers to their  cars 
instead valued at  $3.2  billion,  as well as other 
opportunity  costs; and (5) the costs of the 
terror-related wars in  Iraq and Afghanistan 
which reached $150 billion in 2009.
RESULTS
To summarize, our  analysis for the United 
States appl ies these es t imates and 
assumptions:
1.  We assume those security  measures in 
place before 9/11  continue and that these, 
combined with  the extra  public vigilance 
induced by  9/11, reduce the likelihood of a 
successful  terrorist attack  or reduce the 
losses sustained in  such an attack by  50 
percent;
2.  We assume the enhanced security 
expenditures since 9/11  have successfully 
reduced the likelihood of a  successful 
terrorist attack or  have reduced the losses 
sustained in  such  an attack by  a  further  45 
percent,  leading  to an  overall  risk  reduction 
of 95 percent; and
3. We include in  our  cost  measure only 
enhanced local, state,  and federal security 
expenditures and enhanced intelligence 
costs since 9/11  (totaling  $75  billion per 
y e a r ) ,  l e a v i n g o u t m a n y  o t h e r 
expenditures including  those incurred by 
the private sector,  opportunity  costs, and 
the costs of the terror-related wars in  Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
Table 2  puts this all together. It  displays the 
benefit  generated by  enhanced security 
measures if they  have been  able to prevent  or 
protect  against  an  otherwise successful  attack 
for  a  range of losses from  a  successful attack 
and for a range of annual attack probabilities.
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Table 2. Net benefit in billions of dollars for US enhanced homeland security expenditures of 
$75 billion per year assuming these have reduced risks by 45 percent
Losses from a successful terrorist attack
Annual Probability
of a successful attack 
in the absence of 
security expenditures
$100 




billion $1 trillion $5 trillion
London 
Bombing
9/11 Nuclear Port Nuclear 
Grand Central
0.1% -75 -75 -75 -75 -75 -75 -73
1.0% -75 -75 -75 -75 -74 -71 -53
5.0% -75 -75 -75 -73 -71 -53 38
10.0% -75 -75 -75 -71 -66 -30 150
25.0% -75 -75 -74 -64 -53 38 488
50.0% -75 -75 -74 -53 -30 150 1050
100%1 -75 -75 -73 -30 15 375 2175
Note: Each entry  above represents the benefit-minus-cost result for each loss and for 
each attack probability. Entries that  are positive would be considered to be cost-
effective. A value of -75 denotes no benefit.
Break-Even Analysis
The number of  otherwise successful attacks averted by  security  expenditures required for 
the enhanced expenditures to be cost-effective at several levels of  loss—that is, for the 















1 One per year.
In  the years since 2001  (or, for  that 
matter,  in  those previous to it),  al-Qaeda-like 
terrorists operating  outside of war  zones have 
generally  inflicted less than  $1  million  in 
property  damage and a  limited number of 
fatalities in  each successful  attack. A 
monetary  value of the destruction  wreaked in 
attacks like that would be tens of millions of 
dollars.58 Something  like that  would probably 
have been the losses inflicted if the Times 
Square bomber  of 2010 had carried out what 
seems to have been  his mission, though 
possibly  the damage could have been  higher. 
Of late,  a  number  of analysts and policy 
makers have suggested that  these are the 
kind of attacks that  are far  the most  likely.  If 
a  loss of $100  million – a  high  estimate for 
small successful attacks – is taken to be the 
approximate norm, Table 2  indicates in the 
first  column  that,  even if the likelihood of 
such  an  attack  were 100 percent per  year 
without  the security  measures,  the money 
spent  to prevent or  protect  against  them 
would not  be worth  it: the costs of security 
would outweigh the benefit of the security.
There is another way to look at this. If
Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) × 
(losses sustained in the successful attack) × 
(reduction in risk)
the same equation can be used in  a  break-
even  analysis to calculate how  many  attacks 
would have to take place to justify  the 
expenditure. That is,  thinking  of the “benefit” 
as the cost of the security measure:
(probability of a successful attack) = security 
cost/[(losses sustained in the successful 
attack) × (reduction in risk)]
Thus for  a  successful  terrorist  attack  in  which 
the security  cost  in  $75  billion,  losses 
sustained are $100  million, and the reduction 
in  risk  is .45, the probability  of a successful 
attack would need to be at least
(probability of a successful attack) > $75 
billion/[$100 million × .45] = 1667 attacks per 
year
That  is,  in  order  for enhanced United 
States expenditures on  homeland security  to 
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be deemed cost-effective under  our  approach 
– w h i c h  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  b i a s e s t h e 
consideration  toward the opposite conclusion 
– they  would have to deter,  prevent, foil,  or 
protect  each  year  against  1,667  otherwise 
successful  attacks something  like the one 
attempted on  Times Square in  2010,  or  more 
than  four  per day.  The array  of numbers at 
the bottom  on  Table 2  gives this quantity  for 
a  variety  of loss levels.  Even for  attacks 
inflicting  $1  billion  in damage,  the frequency 
would have to be about one every other day.
The losses from  attacks like those of July 
2005  in  London  would not  exceed five billion 
dollars. For  enhanced security  measures to be 
cost-effective for  attacks of that magnitude, 
their  rate of occurrence without those 
enhanced measures would have had to 
exceed thirty  per  year. 59 If we posit  that  such 
an  attack is thwarted once per  year  (a 
conservative  threat  likelihood by  any 
measure) the ratio of benefit  to cost  is a 
meager 0.03  meaning  that spending  $1  buys 
only three cents of benefits.60
For  a  terrorist  attack, or  set of attacks, 
that,  like those of September  11,  2001, caused 
$200 bi l l ion  dol lars of destruct ion 
(something  that has only  occurred once in  all 
of history),  enhanced expenditures would be 
cost-effective only  if that  sort  of attack would 
have occurred more than once a  year  without 
them. Moreover,  it  is not  clear  that other 
9/11-like attacks would trigger  the extreme 
economic  reaction  engendered by  the original 
intensely  shocking event – that  is, the full 
costs of another  9/11  might  not reach  those 
sustained in the original event.
An extreme upper  bound would be the 
detonation of a  10-kiloton nuclear device at 
New  York’s Grand Central Terminal  on a 
busy  day,  a  nightmare scenario that  might 
exact losses of up to $5  trillion. Enhanced 
homeland security  expenditures would be 
cost-effective in  this case only  if,  without 
them, such  an  extreme attack would have 
successfully  been  executed once every  thirty 
years. 61  The same,  roughly, would hold for 
another extreme scenario,  one in which  the 
terrorist  attack triggers an  expensive war  like 
the one in Iraq.62
There are extreme scenarios that can  be 
taken  to suggest that  enhanced U.S.  security 
expenditures could be cost-effective – the 
nightmare nuclear  vision  as well  as the costly 
overreaction  scenario. However,  for  those 
who find such  outcomes dangerously  likely, 
the policy  response would logically  be to 
spend on  reducing  the risk  of nuclear 
terrorism  in  the one case and to develop 
strictures to overreaction  in the other. The 
logical policy  response would not be,  for 
example,  to spend tens of billions of dollars 
each year on protection measures.
In virtually  all contexts,  then, overall 
enhanced expenditures on homeland security 
in  the United States fail  to be cost-effective – 
spectacularly  so in  most  instances – even  in 
an  analysis that  very  substantially  biases the 
calculations in  favor  of the opposite 
conclusion. In  consequence,  a  great deal of 
money  appears to have been  misspent  and 
would have been far  more productive – saved 
far  more lives – if it  had been  expended in 
other ways.
We are not arguing that  much  of 
homeland security  spending  is wasteful 
because we believe there will  be no more 
terrorist  attacks.  Like crime and vandalism, 
terrorism  will always be a  feature of life, and 
a  condition of zero vulnerability  is impossible 
to achieve.  However, future attacks might not 
be as devastating  as 9/11,  as evidenced by  the 
attacks on  Western  targets in  the ten years 
since 9/11  that,  although  tragic,  have claimed 
victims numbering in  the tens to a  few 
hundred — and none, certainly, have posed 
an  existential threat.  The frequency  and 
severity  of terrorist  attacks are low,  very  low 
in  fact,  which  makes the benefits of enhanced 
counterterrorism  expenditures of a  trillion 
dollars since 9/11  challenging,  to say  the 
least,  to justify  by  any  rational and accepted 
standard of cost-benefit analysis.
Our  findings dealing with  the total 
enhanced homeland security  expenditures 
should not be taken to suggest that  all 
security  measures necessarily  fail to be cost-
effective: there may  be specific measures that 
are cost-effective.63  But each  should be 
subjected to the kind of risk  analysis we have 
appl ied to the overal l increases in 
expenditure.
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GAUGING THE IMPACT OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES ON THE HAZARD
We have assessed the hazard terrorism  poses 
under present conditions – which  include, of 
course,  the existence of counter-terrorism 
measures specifically  designed to reduce that 
hazard. The analysis suggests that additional 
efforts to reduce its likelihood are scarcely 
justified.
It is possible,  of course,  that any  relaxation 
in  these measures will  increase the terrorism 
hazard, that  it  is the counter-terrorism  effort 
is the reason  for  the low  hazard terrorism 
currently  presents. However, in  order  for  the 
terrorism  risk to border  on  becoming 
“ u n a c c e p t a b l e ”  b y  e s t a b l i s h e d r i s k 
conventions — that  is,  to reach an annual 
fatality  rate of one in  100,000  — the number 
of fatalities from  all  forms of terrorism  in  the 
U.S. would have to increase thirty-five-fold.64
Thus, to justify  current counterterrorism 
efforts in  this manner, one would need to 
establish, in  the case of the United States, 
that  the measures have successfully  deterred, 
derailed,  disrupted,  or  protected against 
attacks that would otherwise have resulted in 
the deaths of more than  3,000  people in the 
c o u n t r y  e v e r y  y e a r ,  e q u i v a l e n t t o 
experiencing  attacks as devastating  as those 
on  9/11  at  least once a  year  or  eighteen 
Oklahoma  City  bombings every  year. Even  if 
all  the (mostly  embryonic and in  many  cases 
moronic)  terrorist plots exposed since 9/11  in 
the United States had been  successfully 
carried out,  their  likely  consequences would 
have been  much  lower.  Indeed, as the earlier 
discussion indicates, the number of people 
killed by  terrorists throughout  the world 
outside (and sometimes within) war  zones 
both  before and after 2001  generally  registers 
at far below that number.
A FUTURE INCREASE IN 
TERRORIST DESTRUCTION?
We have been  using  “historical”  data  here, 
and these suggest  the chances an  American 
will perish  at  the hands of a  terrorist is about 
one in  3.5  million per  year.65  However, 
although  there is no guarantee that  the 
terrorism  frequencies of the past  will 
necessarily  persist  into the future,  there 
seems to be little evidence terrorists are 
becoming  any  more destructive, particularly 
in  the West. In  fact, if anything,  there seems 
to be a diminishing, not  expanding, level of 
terrorist  activity  and destruction  at  least 
outside of war  zones.  As Andrew  Mack 
concludes, there is “no evidence of any 
substantial increase in the fatality  toll  since 
data  on  both  domestic and international 
terrorism  began  to be collected in  1998.” 
Indeed, the two datasets he examines that 
have statistics going  back to that year both 
“reveal a decline in deaths from terrorism.” 66
Moreover, as discussed earlier,  according 
both  to official  and prominent  academic 
accounts,  the levels of violence likely  to be 
committed by  Islamic extremists within 
Western countries seems,  if anything  to be in 
decline. Fears about  large,  sophisticated 
attacks have been  replaced by  fears 
concerning tiny  conspiracies,  lone wolves, 
and one-off attackers.
Those who wish  to discount such 
arguments and project ions need to 
demonstrate why  they  think terrorists will 
suddenly  get their  act  together  and inflict 
massively  increased violence, visiting  savage 
discontinuities on  the historical data  series. 67 
Moreover, they  should also restrain 
themselves from  using historical  data 
themselves to explain, for  example, why 
attacks on  New  York  are more likely  than 
ones on Xenia, Ohio, or Perth, Australia.
Actually,  a  most  common  misjudgment 
has been  to embrace extreme events as 
harbingers presaging a  dire departure from 
historical patterns.  In  the months and then 
years after  9/11,  as noted at  the outset, it  was 
almost  universally  assumed that the terrorist 
event was a  harbinger  rather  than  an 
aberration.68 There were similar  reactions to 
Timothy  McVeigh’s 1995  truck bomb attack 
in Oklahoma  City  as concerns about  a 
repetition soared.  And in  1996,  shortly  after 
the terrorist  group Aum  Shinrikyo set  off 
deadly  gas in a  Tokyo subway  station,  one of 
terrorism  studies' top gurus, Walter  Laqueur, 
assured the world that  some terrorist groups 
"almost  certainly" will  use weapons of mass 
destruction  "in  the foreseeable future."69  
Presumably  any  future foreseeable in  1996  is 
now  history, and Laqueur’s near  “certainty” 
has yet to occur.
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THE TRADEOFFS, OPPORTUNITY 
COSTS
Risk  reduction  measures that  produce little 
or  no net  benefit  to society  or  produce it  at a 
very  high  cost cannot be justified on  rational 
life-safety  and economic grounds – they  are 
not only  irresponsible, but,  essentially, 
immoral. When  we spend resources on 
regulations that save lives at  a  high  cost,  we 
forgo the opportunity  to spend those same 
resources on  regulations and processes that 
can  save more lives at  the same cost, or  even 
at  a  lower  one. Homeland security 
expenditure invested in  a  wide range of more 
cost-effective risk  reduction  programs like 
flood protection, vaccination  and screening, 
vehicle  and road safety,  health  care,  and 
occupational health  and safety  would likely 
result  in  far  more significant  benefits to 
society.
For  example,  diverting  a  few  percent  of the 
nearly  $10  billion per  year  spent  on airline 
security  could save many  lives at  a  fraction  of 
the cost  if it  were instead spent on  such 
proven life savers as seat  belts,  bicycle 
helmets, tandem  mass spectrometry 
screening  programs, airbags,  smoke alarms, 
and tornado shelters.  A government obliged 
to allocate funds in  a  manner  that  best 
benefits society  must  explain  why  it  is 
spending  billions of dollars on  security 
measures with  very  little proven  benefit  and 
why  that  policy  is something other  than a 
reckless waste of resources.
It may  be useful  in  this light to put 
counterterrorism  expenditures in  broadest 
comparative context.  A  group of international 
experts assembled by  Bjorn  Lomborg applied 
cost-benefit  thinking  to a  wide range of issues 
and found many  in  which  the benefit  is ten 
times greater  than  the cost and in which  the 
number  of lives saved is spectacular. 
According  to these analysts,  an  investment  of 
merely  $2  billion  could save over  1.5  million 
lives: one million  child deaths could be 
averted by  expanded immunization  coverage 
while community-based nutrition  programs 
could save another  half a  million. If a  miserly 
$2  billion  were redirected from  the homeland 
security  budget ,  the l ikel ihood and 
consequences of such  attacks would hardly 
change, but anywhere from  300  to 60,000 
times more lives – albeit  not  necessarily 
American  or  Western ones – would be saved 
if the funds were instead spent  on  the risk 
reducing measures suggested by  Lomberg 
and his associates. 70
POLITICAL REALITIES
Politicians and bureaucrats do,  of course, face 
considerable political pressure on  the 
terrorism  issue. In  particular,  they  are  fully 
wary  of the fact  that Jeffrey  Rosen  is on to 
something  when he suggests that "we have 
come to believe that  life is risk free and that, 
if something bad happens, there must be a 
government official to blame."71
The dilemma  is nicely  parsed by  James 
Fallows. He points out that  “the political 
incentives here work  only  one way.”  A 
politician who supports more extravagant 
counterterrorism  measures “can  never  be 
proven  wrong”  because an  absence of attacks 
shows that  the “measures have ‘worked’,” 
while a  new  attack shows that we “must go 
farther  still.”  Conversely, a  politician seeking 
to limit expenditure “can  never  be proven 
‘right’”  while “any  future  attack  will always 
and forever be that politician’s ‘fault’.”  Or  in 
the words of Michael Sheehan,  “No terrorism 
expert  or  government  leader  wants to appear 
soft on  terrorism. It’s always safer  to predict 
the worst ; i f nothing  happens,  the 
exaggerators are rarely  held accountable for 
their nightmare scenarios.” 72
In  Friedman’s view, the problem  is quite 
general  not only  in  government and political 
agencies, but  in associated think  tanks: “the 
path  of least resistance is to write about how 
to control a danger  instead of evaluating its 
magnitude.”  And,  although  such  analysts 
“rarely  take orders,”  at the same time “few 
offer  analyses that  harms their  benefactors.” 
It is a  rare bureaucrat  or  expert, he contends, 
who “will  voice opinions harmful  to his 
organization  or  prospects for  appointment, 
but even fewer  will offer those opinions 
without  being asked, and few  policy-makers 
will ask.”73
EXPLAINING RISK VERSUS STOKING FEAR
However,  nothing  in  all  this relieves 
p o l i t i c i a n s a n d b u r e a u c r a t s o f t h e 
fundamental responsibility  of informing the 
public honestly  and accurately  of the risk that 
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terrorism  presents. Daniel  Gardner  notes that 
the failure of Bush administration  “to put  the 
risk in  perspective was total.” 74  That 
continues to be the case with the new one.
Instead, the emphasis has been  on 
exacerbating fears.  As Friedman aptly  notes, 
"For  questionable gains in preparedness,  we 
spread paranoia" and faci l i tate the 
bureaucratically  and politically  appealing 
notion that  "if the threat is everywhere, you 
must  spend everywhere," while developing 
and perpetrating the myth,  or  at  least  the 
impress ion , that  the terror i s ts are 
omnipotent and omnipresent.75
Thus it  was in 2003  that  Homeland 
Security  Secretary  Tom  Ridge divined that 
"extremists abroad are anticipating  near  term 
attacks that  they  believe will  either  rival, or 
exceed" those of 2001. And in 2004,  Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, with  FBI Director 
Robert  Mueller  at his side, announced that 
"credible intelligence from  multiple sources 
indicates that al-Qaeda  plans to attempt  an 
attack  on the United States in  the next  few 
months," that  its "specific  intention" was to 
hit  us "hard," and that the "arrangements" for 
that  attack were already  90  percent complete. 
(Oddly  enough,  Ashcroft  fails to mention this 
memorable headline-grabbing  episode in 
Never Again, his 2006 memoir  of the 
period.)  In  2003  Director  Mueller reported 
that,  although his agency  had yet  actually  to 
identify  an  al-Qaeda cell in  the U.S.,  such 
unident i f ied (or  imagined) ent i t ies 
nonetheless presented "the greatest threat," 
had "developed a  support  infrastructure" in 
the country, and had achieved both  the 
“ability”  and the “intent”  to inflict “significant 
casualties in the U.S.  with  little warning." In 
2005, at  a  time when  the FBI admitted it still 
had been  unable to unearth  a  single true al-
Qaeda cell,  Mueller  continued his dire I-
think-therefore-they-are projections: "I 
remain very  concerned about what  we are not 
seeing," he ominously  ruminated.76 Needless 
to say, the media  remained fully  in  step. 
Thus, on  the fifth  anniversary  of 9/11,  ABC's 
Charles Gibson  dutifully  intoned,  "Putting 
your  child on a  school bus or driving across a 
bridge or  just  going  to the mall  – each  of 
these things is a  small act  of courage – and 
peril is a part of everyday life."77
T e r r o r i s m  i n d u c e d f e a r s c a n b e 
debilitating.  For  one thing  they  can cause 
people routinely  to adopt  skittish, overly  risk 
averse behavior,  at  least for  a  while,  and this 
can  much magnify  the impact  of the terrorist 
attack,  particularly  economically.  That  is, the 
problem  is not  that people are trampling  each 
other in  a  rush  to vacate New  York or 
Washington, but  rather  that  they  may  widely 
adopt  other  forms of defensive behavior,  the 
c u m u l a t i v e c o s t s o f w h i c h  c a n  b e 
considerable.  As Cass Sunstein  notes, "in  the 
context  of terrorism,  fear  is likely  to make 
people reluctant to engage in  certain 
activities, such  as flying  on  airplanes and 
appearing  in  public  places," and "the 
resulting costs can be extremely high."78
Yet,  despite the importance to responsible 
policy  of seeking  to communicate risk and 
despite the costs of irresponsible fear-
mongering,  just  about  the only  official  who 
has ever openly  put the threat  presented by 
terrorism  in  some sort  of context is New 
York’s Mayor Michael  Bloomberg  who,  in 
2007, pointed out  that  people should “get a 
life”  and that they  have a  greater  chance of 
being hit  by  lightning  than  of being struck  by 
terrorism.79
Things are not much  better  in  the media. 
There seemed to be a  brief glimmer  on the 
December  28,  2009, PBS NewsHour when 
Gwen Ifill,  in  introducing a  segment on  the 
then-recent  underwear  bomber’s attempt  to 
down an  airliner,  actually  happened to note 
that  the number  of terrorist  incidents on 
American  airliners over the previous decade 
was one for  every  16.5  million flights.80 This 
interesting  bit  of information,  however, was 
never  brought  up again  either  by  Ifill  or by 
the three terrorism  experts she was 
interviewing. Nor, of course,  did anyone 
think of suggesting  that, at  that  rate,  maybe 
the airlines are already safe enough.
In 2007,  now-former  CIA  Director  Tenet 
revealed on CBS' 60 Minutes  that  his 
"operational intuition" was telling  him  that 
al-Qaeda  had “infiltrated a  second wave or a 
third wave into the United States at  the time 
of 9/11,”  though he added,  "Can I prove it  to 
you? No." (One might think that aging 
members of that  “wave” would have since had 
a  great  incentive  to actually  do  something 
since the longer  they  linger, the greater  the 
likelihood they  will  be exposed and caught.) 
And DHS Secretary  Michael Chertoff 
informed us a  few  months later  that  his gut 
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was telling him  there'd be an  attack during 
that  summer.  It  would seem  that  when 
officials responsible for  public  safety  issue 
fear-inducing  proclamations based by their 
own admission on  nothing, they  should be 
held to account. Then in  2010, Napolitano 
joined in announcing  that,  although  the 
likelihood of a  large-scale organized attack 
was reduced,  the continued danger  of a 
small-scale disorganized attack meant that 
the terrorist threat was somehow  now  higher 
than  at  any  time since 9/11.  As Ian Lustick 
puts it, the government "can never make 
enough  progress toward 'protecting  America' 
to reassure Americans against  the fears it  is 
helping to stoke."81
P o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s s u p p l y  a n 
understandable excuse for  expending money, 
but not a  valid one, and they  do not  relieve 
officials of the responsibility  of seeking  to 
expend public funds wisely.  It  is particularly 
important to do so with  homeland security 
expenditures. They  deal  not with  bridges to 
nowhere or  with  crop subsidies,  but with 
public safety  – or  domestic tranquility  – the 
central,  fundamental reason  for  the existence 
of government in  the first place. It  is 
imperative that  decisions be made sensibly 
and responsibly  in  this area. To be irrational 
with  your  own money  may  be to be foolhardy, 
to give in  to guilty  pleasure,  or  to wallow  in 
caprice.  But  to be irrational with  other 
people’s money, particularly  where public 
safety  is the issue, is to be irresponsible,  to 
betray  an essential trust.  In  the end, it 
becomes a  dereliction  of duty  that cannot be 
justified by  political pressure,  bureaucratic 
constraints, or emotional drives.
ARE POLITICAL CONCERNS 
OVERWROUGHT?
However,  although  political pressures may 
force actions and expenditures that are 
unwise, they  usually  do not precisely  dictate 
the level  of expenditure.  Thus,  although  there 
are public demands to “do something”  about 
terror ism,  nothing  in  that  demand 
specifically  requires removing  shoes in 
airport  security  lines, requiring passports to 
enter  Canada,  spreading  bollards like 
dandelions,  or  making  a  huge number of 
buildings into forbidding fortresses.
The United Kingdom,  which  seems to face 
an  internal threat  from  terrorism  that  is 
considerably  greater than  that  for  the United 
States,  appears nonetheless to spend 
proportionately  much  less than half as much 
on  homeland security, and the same holds for 
Canada  and Australia. Yet politicians and 
bureaucrats there do not  seem  to suffer 
threats to their  positions or  other  political 
problems because of it. 82
As this might  suggest, it  is possible 
politicians and bureaucrats are overly  fearful 
about  the political consequences.  It  is often 
argued that  there is a  political  imperative for 
public officials to "do something" (which 
usually  means overreact) when a  dramatic 
terrorist  event  takes place – "You  can't  just 
not do anything." However,  history  clearly 
demonstrates that overreaction  is not 
necessarily  required.  Sometimes,  in  fact, 
leaders have been able to restrain  their 
instinct  to overreact.  Even  more important, 
restrained reaction  – or  even  capitulation  to 
terrorist  acts – has often  proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically.  This is a particularly 
important issue because it  certainly  appears 
that  avoiding  overreaction  is by  far  the most 
cost-effective counterterrorism measure.
Consider,  for  example, the two instances 
of terrorism  that  killed the most  Americans 
before September  2001. Ronald Reagan's 
response to the first of these, the suicide 
bombing  in  Lebanon  in 1983  that resulted in 
the deaths of 241  American  Marines,  was to 
make a  few  speeches and eventually  to pull 
the troops out.  The venture seems to have 
had no negative impact  on  his reelection  a 
few  months later.  The other was the 
December  1988  bombing  of a  Pan Am  airliner 
over  Lockerbie,  Scotland,  in  which  187 
Americans perished.  Perhaps in  part  because 
this dramatic  and tragic event  took place 
after  the elections of that  year, the official 
response, beyond seeking  to obtain 
compensation  for  the victims,  was simply  to 
apply  meticulous police work  in  an  effort to 
tag the culprits,  a  process that bore fruit only 
three years later  and then  only  because of an 
unlikely  bit  of luck. 83 But  that  cautious, even 
laid back,  response proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically.
Similarly, after  an  unacceptable loss of 
American lives in  Somalia  in  1993, Bill 
Clinton  responded by  withdrawing  the troops 
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without  noticeable negative impact on  his 
1996  reelection  bid. Although  Clinton  reacted 
with  (apparently  counterproductive)  military 
retaliations after the two U.S.  embassies were 
bombed in  Africa  in  1998,  his administration 
did not  have a  notable response to terrorist 
attacks on American  targets in Saudi Arabia 
(Khobar  Towers) in  1996  or  to the bombing 
of the U.S.S.  Cole in 2000, and these non-
responses never  caused it political pain. 
George W. Bush's response to the anthrax 
attacks of 2001  did include a  costly  and 
wasteful stocking  up of anthrax vaccine and 
enormous extra  spending by  the U.S. Post 
Office.  However, beyond that,  it  was the same 
as Clinton's had been to the terrorist attacks 
against the World Trade Center  in  1993  and 
in  Oklahoma City  in  1995  and the same as the 
one applied in  Spain  when  terrorist  bombed 
trains there in 2004  or  in  Britain  after  attacks 
in  2005: the dedicated application  of police 
work  to try  to apprehend the perpetrators. 
This approach proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically. Similarly,  the Indian 
government was able to neglect  popular 
demands for  retaliatory  attacks on  Pakistan 
for  the damage inflicted on  Mumbai in  2008 
by terrorists based there.84
Thus, despite short-term  demands that 
some sort  of action  must be taken, experience 
suggests politicians can  often  successfully 
ride out  this demand after  the obligatory  and 
essentially  cost-free expressions of outrage 
are prominently issued.
It is true that  few  voters spend a  great 
amount  of time following  the ins and outs of 
policy  issues and even  fewer  are certifiable 
policy  wonks.  But they  are grown-ups, and it 
is just  possible they  would respond 
reasonably  to an  adult conversation  about 
terrorism. After  all, Mayor  Bloomberg’s “get a 
life”  outburst  in  2007  did not have negative 
consequences for him. He is still  in  office 
and, although  he had some difficulties in  his 
reelection two years later,  his blunt 
comments about  terrorism  were not  the 
cause.
There is also a  tendency  to assume that  the 
outsized reaction  to 9/11  will  necessarily  be 
repeated if there is another  attack  in  the 
United States. However, London  experienced 
a  double hit  in  2005: attacks on  the 
underground two weeks apart  (of which  only 
the first was successful). But the politicians in 
charge survived.  Also potentially  relevant 
here is the fact  that  terrorist  attacks on  resort 
areas in  Bali in  2002  had a  far  larger  negative 
impact  on  tourism  than  did subsequent ones 
in 2005.
Interest ing in  this regard is the 
remarkably  muted reaction  of the American 
public (and media) to the 2009  shootings by 
a  Muslim  psychiatrist at  Fort  Hood, Texas, 
that  killed thirteen  and injured thirty  more. 
Although  this could be considered to an act of 
a  deranged man, it  is generally  taken  to be a 
case of Islamic terrorism, and it  is by  far  the 
worst  since 9/11  in  the United States. 
Although  obviously  far  less costly  than  the 
earlier  terrorist  event, it  could have been 
taken  to be the next  step in  a  terrorist 
onslaught – something that Americans have 
long  been ominously  waiting  for.  However,  it 
failed to generate much  outrage or  demand 
for  an  outsized response. Indeed,  a  year  later 
it  was scarcely  remembered,  as when the 
prominent  journalist,  James Fallows,  mused 
about  raising  “the certainty  that some day 
another terrorist  attack  will succeed”  without 
noting that one had already taken place.85
Then  in 2010, President  Barack  Obama 
rather  candidly  observed to Washington Post 
reporter  Bob Woodward,  “We can  absorb  a 
terrorist  attack.  We'll do everything  we can  to 
prevent it, but even a  9/11,  even the biggest 
attack  ever  . . . we absorbed it  and we are 
stronger.” 86 This may  have been  the first  time 
any  official  acknowledged the issue in public, 
and Obama  even used the unpleasant  word 
“absorb”  rather than  the more politically 
c o r r e c t “ r e s i l i e n t . ”  O b a m a ’ s h i g h l y 
unconventional statement drew  great 
attention  in the press, but  it hardly  seems to 
have hurt the President’s effectiveness or 
approval ratings.
Terrorism  can  inspire self-destructive 
overreaction  like no other  hazard,  and this 
can  be massively  costly  – the two wars 
impelled or  facilitated by  9/11  are only  the 
most vivid examples.  Indeed, the costs of 
overreaction  can  be far  higher  than  those 
inflicted by  the terrorists themselves – as 
they  were even for  9/11,  by  far  the most 
destructive terrorist  act  in  history.87  Osama 
bin Laden  has gloated over  this phenomenon, 
claiming his goal is to bleed America into 
bankruptcy, something  only  the United States 
could do to itself.88
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The notion  that  this is a  problem  seems to 
be dawning on  people considering  terrorism. 
In  2004, Stephen  Flynn  began  an  article by 
dramatically  proclaiming  that  the United 
States is "living  on  borrowed time – and 
squandering  it" and ending  it  with a  warning 
about the "long,  deadly  struggle against 
terrorism." He also admitted that he often 
labored under  a  sense of despair  and dread 
and suggested that  officials must  assume that 
terrorists will "soon" launch  attacks far  more 
deadly  and disruptive than  those of 9/11.89 
And late in  the same year he contributed to 
an  op-ed article vividly  entitled “’Our Hair  Is 
on  Fire’,”  declaring  that  al-Qaeda  had both 
the ability  and the intent  to detonate  a 
weapon of mass destruction  in  the United 
States and envisioning graves by  the 
hundreds of thousands, the collapse of the 
economy,  and “perhaps a fatal  blow  to our 
way  of life.” 90  However,  by  2010,  he was 
arguing that  the greatest  threat  from 
terrorism  “comes from  what we would do to 
ourselves when we are spooked”  and that  is it 
this “that  makes it  an appealing  tool for  our 
adversaries.” 91
And in  early  2005,  Richard Clarke, 
counterterrorism  coordinator  from  the 
Clinton  administration,  issued a  scenario that 
appeared in  the Atlantic as a  cover  story  in 
which  he darkly  envisioned shootings at 
casinos, campgrounds,  theme parks,  and 
malls in  2005, bombings in  subways and 
railroads in  2006, missile attacks on  airliners 
in  2007,  and devastating cyber attacks in 
2008.92 By  2010,  however,  he was advocating 
that  “we should not  adopt procedures that 
inconvenience the public more than  they  do 
the terrorists and amount  to little more than 
security  theater,”  that “those who seek 
political gain  from  the murder  of Americans” 
should be “regarded as despicable,”  and that, 
should terrorists successfully  attack  again, we 
should “refine our tactics and procedures,” 
but “not overreact.”  To do this, however, 
notes Clarke,  would require “a good dose”  of 
that  oxymoronic  commodity,  “political 
courage.” 93
The 2004 art icle in  which  Flynn 
proclaimed the United States to be "living  on 
borrowed time – and squandering it" and 
warned about the "long,  deadly  struggle 
against terrorism" also includes something  of 
a  midcourse correction. In seeking  to supply 
a  standard for  "how  much  security  is 
enough,”  he suggested that  that  happy 
moment would come about  when  "the 
American  people can  conclude that  a  future 
attack  on  U.S.  soil will be an  exceptional 
event  that  does not  require wholesale 
changes in  how  they  go about their  lives."94 It 
seems reasonable to suggest  that  they  can  do 
so right  now  – and,  for  that matter, could 
have done so in 2004.
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